Abstract-Cloud computing systems, in which clients rent and share computing resources of third party platforms, have gained widespread use in recent years. Furthermore, cloud computing for mobile systems (i.e., systems in which the clients are mobile devices) have too been receiving considerable attention in technical literature. We propose a new method of delegating computations of resource-constrained mobile clients, in which multiple servers interact to construct an encrypted program known as garbled circuit. Next, using garbled inputs from a mobile client, another server executes this garbled circuit and returns the resulting garbled outputs. Our system assures privacy of the mobile client's data, even if the executing server chooses to collude with all but one of the other servers. We adapt the garbled circuit design of Beaver et al. and the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich et al. for the purpose of building a secure cloud computing for mobile systems. Our method incorporates the novel use of the cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator of Blum et al. that enables the mobile client to efficiently retrieve the result of the computation, as well as to verify that the evaluator actually performed the computation. We analyze the server-side and client-side complexity of our system. Using real-world data, we evaluate our system for a privacy preserving search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client. We also measure the time taken to construct and evaluate the garbled circuit for varying number of servers, demonstrating the feasibility of our secure and verifiable cloud computing for mobile systems.
INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing systems, in which the clients rent and share computing resources of third party platforms such as Amazon Elastic Cloud, Microsoft Azure, etc., have gained widespread use in recent years. Provisioned with a large pool of hardware and software resources, these cloud computing systems enable clients to perform computations on a vast amount of data without setting up their own infrastructure [1] . However, providing the cloud service provider with the client data in plaintext form to carry out the computations will result in complete loss of data privacy.
Homomorphic encryption [26] is an approach to tackle the problem of preserving data privacy, which can allow the cloud service providers to perform specific computations directly on the encrypted client data, without requiring private decryption keys. Recently, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes (e.g., Gentry et al. [13] ) have been proposed, which enable performing any arbitrary computation on encrypted data. However, FHE schemes are currently impractical for mobile cloud computing applications due to extremely large cipher text size. For instance, to achieve 128-bit security, the client is required to exchange a few Giga bytes of ciphertext with the cloud server, for each bit of the plain text message [13] . Thus, there is a need for a more efficient alternative suitable for mobile systems.
Yao's garbled circuits approach [30] , [31] , which we consider in our work, is a potential alternative to FHE schemes that can drastically reduce the ciphertext size. Any computation can be represented using a Boolean circuit, for which, there exists a corresponding garbled circuit [30] , [31] , [14] , [15] . Each gate in a garbled circuit can be unlocked using a pair of input wire keys that correspond to the underlying plaintext bits; and the association between the wire keys and the plaintext bits is kept secret from the cloud server that performs the computation. Unlocking a gate using a pair of input wire keys reveals an output wire key, which, in turn, serves as an input wire key for unlocking the subsequent gate in the next level of the circuit. Thus, garbled circuits can enable oblivious evaluation of any arbitrary function, expressible as a Boolean circuit, on a third-party cloud server.
While garbled circuits preserve the privacy of client data, they are, however, one time programs -using the same version of the circuit more than once compromises the garbled circuit and reveals to an adversarial evaluator whether the semantics have changed or remained the same for a set of input and output wires between successive evaluations. Expecting the client to create a new version of the garbled circuit for each evaluation, however, is an unreasonable solution, since creating a garbled circuit is at least as expensive
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as evaluating the underlying Boolean circuit! Thus, in contrast to FHE schemes such as that of Gentry [13] , that can directly delegate the desired computation to the cloud servers, a scheme using garbled circuits, presents the additional challenge of efficiently delegating to the cloud servers the creation of garbled circuit.
We propose a new method, in which whenever the client needs to perform a computation, the client employs a number of cloud servers to create a new version of the garbled circuit in a distributed manner. Each server generates a set of private input bits using unique seed value from the client and interacts with all the other servers to create a new garbled circuit, which is a function of the private input bits of all the servers. Essentially, the servers engage in a secure multiparty computation protocol (e.g., Goldreich et al. [14] , [15] ) to construct the desired garbled circuit without revealing their private inputs to one another. Once a new version of the garbled circuit is created using multiple servers, the client delegates the evaluation to an arbitrary server in the cloud. The resulting version of the garbled circuit, the garbled inputs that can unlock the circuit, and the corresponding garbled outputs, remain unrecognizable to the evaluator, even if it chooses to collude with any strict-subset of servers that participated in the creation of the garbled circuit.
Our proposed system is designed to readily exploit the real-world asymmetry that exists between typical mobile clients and cloud servers -while the mobile client-s are resource constrained, the cloud servers, on the other hand, are sufficiently provisioned to perform numerous intensive computation and communication tasks. To achieve secure and verifiable computing capability, our system requires very little computation and communication involvement from the mobile client beyond the generation and exchange of compact cipher text messages. However, using significantly larger resources available to them, the cloud servers can efficiently generate and exchange a large volume of random bits necessary for carrying out the delegated computation. Thus, our proposed scheme is very suitable for mobile environments 1 . We adapt the garbled circuit design of Beaver, Micali, Rogaway (BMR [3] , [27] ), and the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich et al. [14] , [15] to suit them for the purpose of building a secure cloud computing system. To facilitate the construction of the garbled circuit, and also to enable the client to efficiently retrieve and verify the result of the computation, our method incorporates the novel use of the cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator of Blum, Blum, Shub [5] , [28] , whose strength relies on the computational difficulty of factorizing large numbers into primes. Our proposed system enables the 1. While our proposed system is especially beneficial for clients in a mobile environment, due to compact cipher text messages, it is also suitable for clients in other environments that need to delegate its computations to the cloud servers in a secure manner.
client to efficiently verify that the evaluator actually and fully performed the requested computation.
Our major contributions in this work include the following: (i) we design a secure mobile cloud computing system using multiple servers that enables the client to delegate any arbitrary computation, (ii) our system assures the privacy of the client input and the result of the computation, even if the evaluating server colludes with all but one of the servers that created the garbled circuit, (iii) our system enables the client to efficiently retrieve/recover the result of the computation and to verify whether the evaluator actually performed the computation, (iv) we present an analysis of the server-side and client-side complexity of our proposed scheme. Our findings show that in comparison to Gentry's FHE scheme, our scheme uses very small cipher text messages suitable for mobile clients, (v) using real-world data, we evaluate our system for a privacy preserving search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client, and (vi) we measure the time taken to construct and evaluate the garbled circuit for varying number of servers, demonstrating the feasibility of our system.
A HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF OUR SYSTEM
In the proposed system, the client employs a set of (n + 2) servers, {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , p c , p e }. Initially, the client sends a description of the desired computation (such as addition of two numbers, computation of hamming distance between two bit sequences, etc.), and a unique seed value s i to each server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Each of these n servers first creates (or retrieves from its repository, if available already) a Boolean circuit (B) that corresponds to the requested computation. Using the unique seed value s i , each server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n) generates a private pseudorandom bit sequence whose length is proportional to the total number of wires in the Boolean circuit (B). Then, using the private pseudorandom bit sequences and the Boolean circuit (B) as inputs, these n servers interact with one another, while performing some local computations, according to a secure multiparty computation protocol, to create their shares (GC i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n)) for an one-time program called garbled circuit.
Once the shares for the garbled circuit are created, the client requests each server, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), to send its share, GC i , to the server p c . Performing an XOR operation on these shares, the server p c creates the desired circuit, GC = GC 1 ⊕ GC 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ GC n . Subsequently, the client instructs the server p c to send the garbled circuit GC to another server p e for evaluation. Now, using the unique seed values s i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the client generates on its own garbled input values for each input wire in the circuit and sends them to the server p e for evaluation. Using these garbled inputs, the server p e unlocks the gates in the first level of the 
to construct shares of the garbled circuit GC; 3.) Each p i sends its share (GC i ) to p c ; 4.) p c computes GC = GC 1 ⊕ GC 2 ⊕ GC 3 , and sends it to p e ; 5.) Client generates garbled inputs, and sends them to p e ; 6.) p e evaluates GC, and sends the garbled outputs to the client.
circuit to obtain the corresponding garbled outputs, which, in turn, unlocks the gates in the second level of the circuit, and so on. In this manner, the server p e unlocks all the gates in the circuit, obtains the garbled outputs of the circuit, and sends them to the client. The client now converts these garbled output values into plaintext bits to recover the result of the desired computation. Fig. 1 depicts an overview of our secure cloud computing system model with (n + 2) = 5 servers.
Our Adversary Model
We assume the existence of a secure communication channel between the client and each of the (n + 2) servers, {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , p c , p e }, for sending unique seed values for pseudorandom bit generation, identity of the other servers, etc. We assume that all pairs of communicating servers authenticate one another. We assume a very capable adversary, where the evaluator p e may individually collude with any proper subset of the n servers, {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }, and still remain unable to determine the semantics of any garbled value that the evaluator observes during evaluation. Thus, our adversary model depicts a very realistic scenariowhere the client may be certain that some (however, not all) of the parties are corrupt, however, it is uncertain which of the parties are corrupt. If any adversarial party attempts to eavesdrop and analyze the set of all message exchanges between different parties, and also analyze the set of all the messages that it has legitimately received from the other parties, it still cannot determine the shares of the other parties, or the semantics of the garbled value pairs that are assigned to each wire in the circuit. Further, if the evaluator, p e , returns arbitrary numbers as outputs to the client, the client can detect this efficiently. In our model, a new garbled circuit is created for every evaluation. This prevents an adversarial evaluator from determining the set of inputs and outputs that have changed or remained the same between different evaluations.
Main Characteristics of our system
We highlight some of the main features of our secure cloud computing system in this subsection. 
, interact with one another for creating the garbled circuit, the server p e evaluates the garbled circuit, independently. 4) Precomputation of garbled circuits: Since evaluation of the garbled circuit requires no interaction among the servers, if several versions of the garbled circuit for a given computation are precomputed and stored at the evaluator, in advance, then it can readily carry out the requested computation. Thus, the client will only incur the relatively short time taken to evaluate the garbled circuit. In other words, precomputation will drastically improve the response time for the client. 5) Collusion Resistance: To interpret any garbled value, the evaluator, p e , would need to collude with all the n servers, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Thus, even if (n − 1) out of the n servers are corrupt and collude with the evaluator, the privacy of the client's inputs and the result of the computation are still preserved. 6) Verification of outputs: The client has the ability to verify that the evaluator actually carried out the requested computation.
BACKGROUND
We briefly describe the construction and evaluation of Yao's garbled circuits [30] , [31] , as well as the oblivious transfer protocols of Naor and Pinkas [24] , [25] .
Yao's Garbled Circuit
Each wire in the circuit is associated with a pair of keys known as garbled values that correspond to the ], respectively.
Suppose that the client wishes to delegate the computation of Fig. 2 , i.e., ((a|b) ⊕ (c.d)), to a server in the cloud. The server is provided with a description of the circuit (Fig. 2) along with the set of the garbled tables (Table 1) , which together represents a garbled circuit. However, the client keeps the mapping between the garbled values and the underlying binary values as secret. For example, to evaluate the circuit with inputs a = 1, b = 0, c = 0, d = 1, the client provides the set of garbled inputs, ω , to the cloud server. Now, assume that there exists a mechanism to determine whether a value is decrypted correctly; for example, through zero-padding. Using ω 1 0 , ω 0 1 as keys, the server attempts to decrypt all the four entries in the garbled table for gate P ; however, only the fourth entry will decrypt correctly to reveal the garbled output ω . Thus, the server can perform an oblivious evaluation of the garbled circuit and return the result of the computation ω 1 6 to the client. Using the secret mapping, the client can determine that the garbled value ω 1 6 corresponds to the binary value 1.
In our work, we use an alternative garbled circuit design from Beaver, Micali, Rogaway (BMR [3] , [27] ), and adapt it, as we describe in Section 4, for the purpose of building a secure cloud computing system.
1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
There are two parties, a sender and a chooser. The sender holds two messages, M 0 , M 1 , and the chooser holds a choice bit, σ ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, the chooser learns M σ only, while the sender learns nothing.
Let p = 2q + 1 denote a safe prime number; i.e., q is also a prime number. Let Z * p = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , (p − 1)}, which denotes the set of integers that are relatively prime to p. Let G denote a subgroup of Z * p , where |G| = q. Let g denote the generator for G.
The sender randomly chooses an element, C ∈ G, and sends it to the chooser. Note that the discrete logarithm of C is unknown to the chooser. The chooser randomly selects an integer, k, (1 ≤ k ≤ q), and sets P K σ = g k mod p, and
The chooser sends P K 0 to the sender. Note that P K 0 does not reveal the choice bit σ to the sender.
The sender calculates P K 1 = C ×(P K 0 ) −1 mod p on its own, and randomly chooses two elements, r 0 , r 1 ∈ G. Let h(x) denote the output of the hash function (e.g., SHA) on input x. Let E i denote the encryption of M i , ∀i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the sender calculates
, and sends both E 0 , E 1 to the chooser.
The chooser decrypts E σ to obtain M σ as follows. Let l 1 = g rσ mod p and l 2 = h(P K rσ σ mod p) ⊕ M σ denote the first and second numbers respectively in E σ . The chooser calculates M σ using the relation,
Note that since the discrete logarithm of C, and hence P K 1−σ , is unknown to the chooser, it cannot retrieve M 1−σ from E 1−σ .
1-out-of-4 Oblivious Transfer
There are two parties, a sender and a chooser. The sender holds four messages, M 00 , M 01 , M 10 , M 11 , and the chooser holds two choice bits, σ 1 , σ 2 . At the end of the 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, the chooser learns M σ1σ2 only, while the sender learns nothing.
The sender randomly generates two pairs of keys, (L 0 , L 1 ), (R 0 , R 1 ), and computes the encryptions of M 00 , M 01 , M 10 , M 11 as follows. Let F k (x) denote the output of a pseudorandom function such as AES-128, that is keyed using k on the input x. Let E ij denote the encryption of M ij , ∀i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Then,
The sender and the chooser engage in 1-out-of-2 OT twice. In the first 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender holds two messages, L 0 , L 1 , and the chooser holds the choice bit, σ 1 ; at the end of this OT, the chooser obtains L σ1 .
In the second 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender holds two messages, R 0 , R 1 , and the chooser holds the choice bit, σ 2 ; at the end of this OT, the chooser obtains R σ2 . Now, the sender sends all the four encryptions, E 00 , E 01 , E 10 , E 11 , to the chooser. Using L σ1 , R σ2 , the chooser decrypts E σ1σ2 to obtain M σ1σ2 , as
SECURE AND VERIFIABLE CLOUD COM-PUTING FOR MOBILE SYSTEMS
In Section 4.1, we present the construction of BMR garbled circuit [3] , [27] using n servers through the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich et al. [14] , [15] . In Section 4.2, we highlight how we adapt the protocol of Goldreich and the garbled circuit design of BMR, in order to suit them for our secure cloud computing model. In our model, each server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), generates shares of garbled values using cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generation method of Blum, Blum, Shub [5] , [28] . In Section 4.3, we present our method of how the client efficiently recovers the result of the delegated computation, as well as how the client verifies that the evaluator in fact carried out the computation. We summarize our secure cloud computing model in Section 4.4.
Construction and Evaluation of Garbled Circuits
4.1.1 Construction of the garbled circuit, GC Garbled Value Pairs: Each wire in the circuit is associated with a pair of garbled values representing the underlying plaintext bits 0 and 1. Let A denote a specific gate in the circuit, whose two input wires are x, y; and whose output wire is z. Let (α 0 , α 1 ), (β 0 , β 1 ) and (γ 0 , γ 1 ) denote the pair of garbled values associated with the wires x, y and z, respectively. Note that LSB(α 0 ) = LSB(β 0 ) = LSB(γ 0 ) = 0 and
Each garbled value is (nk + 1) bits long, where n denotes the number of servers and k denotes the security parameter. Essentially, each garbled value is a concatenation of shares from the n servers. Let a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}. Then the garbled values are expressed as follows: α a = α a1 ||α a2 ||α a3 || . . . ||α an ||a; β b = β b1 ||β b2 ||β b3 || . . . ||β bn ||b; γ c = γ c1 ||γ c2 ||γ c3 || . . . ||γ cn ||c; where α ai , β bi , γ ci are shares of server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
λ Value: Each wire in the circuit is also associated with a 1-bit λ value that determines the semantics for the pair of garbled values. Specifically, the garbled value whose LSB = b represents the underlying plaintext bit (b ⊕ λ).
Collusion Resistance: Let λ x , λ y , λ z denote the λ values for the wires x, y, z respectively. Then,
Note that the λ value of each wire is unknown to any individual server. Consequently, the evaluator of the garbled circuit must collude with all the n servers to interpret the garbled values.
Garbled Table: Each gate, A, in the circuit, is associated with an ordered list of four values, [A 00 , A 01 , A 10 , A 11 ], which represents the garbled table for gate A. Let ⊗ ∈ {XOR, AN D} denote the binary operation of gate A. Then, the value of one specific entry,
where G a and G b are pseudorandom functions that expand k bits into (nk + 1) bits. Specifically, let G denote a pseudorandom generator, which on providing a k-bit input seed, outputs a sequence of (2nk+2) bits, i.e., if |s| = k, then |G(s)| = (2nk+2). G may represent the output of AES block cipher in output feedback mode, for example. Then, G 0 (s) and G 1 (s) denote the first and last (nk + 1) bits of G(s) respectively.
To compute a garbled table entry A ab , such as the one shown above, the n servers use the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich [14] , [15] (Section 4.1.2), where f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) = A ab , and for each server,
] is a vector of length m = (3 + 2(nk + 1) + 2k) bits. In this manner, the n servers jointly compute each entry in the garbled table for each gate in the circuit.
Secure multiparty computation of an entry, A ab
Assume that n parties need to compute the value of an arbitrary function of their private inputs, namely f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) without revealing their private inputs to one another. Assume that the function f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is expressed as a Boolean circuit (B ) 2 using a set of XOR and AND gates.
We briefly describe the secure multipary computation protocol of Goldreich [14] , [15] as follows. For each wire in the Boolean circuit, the actual binary value corresponds to the XOR-sum of shares of all the n parties.
Evaluation of each XOR gate in the circuit is carried out locally. Specifically, each party merely performs an XOR operation over its shares for the two input wires to obtain its share for the output wire.
Evaluation of each AND gate in the circuit, on the other hand, requires communication between all pairs of parties. For the two inputs wires to the AND gate, let a i , b i denote the shares of party p i ; and let a j , b j denote the shares of party p j . Then, the XOR-sum of the shares for the output wire of the AND gate is expressed as follows:
2. Boolean circuit B is different from Boolean circuit B. While B is a circuit that corresponds to the computation requested by the client (e.g., addition of two numbers), B is a circuit that creates the entries such as A ab in the garbled tables of the garbled circuit GC.
Each party p i locally computes ((a i .b i ).I); and the computation of each partial-product, ((a i ⊕a j ).(b i ⊕b j )), is accomplished using 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer (OT) between p i and p j , such that no party reveals its shares to the other party [14] , [15] .
Following the above procedure, the n parties evaluate every gate in the circuit. Thus, in the end, for the BMR protocol, as we have described above, each server The garbled table for Let α, β denote the garbled values for the two input wires of a gate during evaluation. Let a, b denote the LSB values of α, β respectively. Then, the garbled value for the output wire, γ, is recovered using α, β, A ab , as shown in the two-step process below:
Evaluation of the garbled circuit, GC
1) split the most significant nk bits of α into n parts, α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , . . . , α n , each with k bits; similarly, split the most significant nk bits of β into n parts, β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , . . . , β n , each with k bits; i.e.,
Thus, the garbled output for any gate in the circuit can be computed using the garbled table and the two garbled inputs to the gate. Note that while the construction of the garbled circuit requires interaction among all the n parties, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the server p e can perform the evaluation independently.
Secure and Verifiable Cloud Computing through Secure Multiparty Computation
In a secure multiparty computation protocol, multiple parties hold private inputs, and receive the result of the computation. However, in our proposed secure cloud computing system, while multiple parties participate in the creation of garbled circuits, only the client holds private inputs and obtains the result of the computation in garbled form. Therefore, we adapt the protocols of Goldreich and BMR in a number of ways, as we discuss in this section, to build an efficient, secure cloud computing system, that also enables the client to easily verify the outputs of the computation.
First, note that in the protocol of Goldreich [14] , [15] , each party p i sends its share (f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )) i to all the other parties. Using these shares, each party computes f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) as 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )) i . In our secure cloud computing system, however, we require each server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), to send its share to only one server, p c , which combines them using the XOR operation to produce entries such as A ab for each garbled table in the garbled circuit, GC.
Second, in the BMR protocol [3] , [27] , which is also a secure multiparty computation protocol, in addition to creating the garbled circuit, for evaluation, the n parties also create garbled inputs using secure multiparty computation. Then, each of these n parties evaluates the garbled circuit and obtains the result of the computation. In our system model, since only the client holds the inputs for the computation, it generates the corresponding garbled input for each input wire on its own using the seed values it sends to each server,
Third, in the BMR protocol [3] , [27] , the λ value is set to zero for each output wire in the Boolean circuit. Therefore, each party evaluating the garbled circuit obtains the result of the computation in plaintext form from the LSB of the garbled output for each output wire in the circuit. In our system model, however, the λ value for each output wire is also determined using the XOR-sum of the shares from all the n servers, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n). As a consequence, result of the computation in plaintext form remains as secret for the evaluator p e .
Fourth, in the protocol of Goldreich [14] , [15] , each party splits and shares each of its private input bits with all the other parties over pairwise secure communication channels. In our approach, we eliminate this communication using a unique seed value s ik that the client shares with all pairs of parties,
To split and share each of its m private input bits x ij , (1 ≤ j ≤ m), party p i generates r kj , (∀k = i), using the seed value s ik . More specifically, party p i sets its own share as x ij n k=1,k =i r kj , where r kj = R(s ik , j, gate id , entry id ) corresponds to the output of the pseudorandom bit generator using the seed value s ik for the j th private input bit of party p i , for a specific garbled table entry (entry id ) of one of the gates (gate id ) in the circuit. Likewise, party p k sets its own share as r kj = R(s ik , j, gate id , entry id ). The total number of pseudorandom bits generated by each party for the protocol of Goldreich equals 2(n − 1)m × 4N g = 8(n − 1)m × N g , where m = (3 + 2(nk + 1) + 2k), and N g denotes the total number of gates in the circuit. In other words, our approach eliminates the exchange of a very large number of bits (O(n 3 kN g ) bits) between the n parties. Fifth, our novel use of the Blum, Blum, Shub pseudorandom number generator for generating garbled value shares enables the client to efficiently recover and verify the outputs of the computation. The client can detect a cheating evaluator, if it returns arbitrary values as output. We present this in a greater detail in Section 4.3.
Recovery and Verification of Outputs
We address the following questions in this subsection. First, how does the client efficiently retrieve/recover the result of the computation without itself having to repeat the delegated computations? Second, how does the client verify that the evaluator, in fact, evaluated the garbled circuit? In other words, is it possible for the client to determine whether the evaluator returned arbitrary numbers without carrying out any computation at all, instead of the actual garbled output for each output wire?
We can enable the client to efficiently retrieve and verify the outputs returned by the evaluator, p e . To achieve this, each of the n parties that participates in the creation of the garbled circuit uses the cryptographically secure Blum, Blum, Shub pseudorandom number generator [5] , [28] , as we have outlined below.
Let N denote the product of two large prime numbers, p, q, which are congruent to 3 mod 4. The client chooses a set of n seed values, {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n }, where each seed value s i belongs to Z * N , the set of integers relatively prime to N . The client sends the modulus value N and a unique seed value s i to each party p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n) over a secure communication channel. However, the client keeps the prime factors, p, q, of N as a secret.
Let b i,j denote the j th bit generated by the party p i . Then, b i,j = LSB(x i,j ), where x i,j = x 2 i,(j−1) mod N , and x i,0 = s i .
Each wire ω in the circuit is associated with a pair of garbled values, (ω 0 , ω 1 ), and a 1-bit λ ω value. Then, ω 0 = ω 01 ||ω 02 ||ω 03 || . . . ||ω 0n ||0, ω 1 = ω 11 ||ω 12 ||ω 13 || . . . || ω 1n ||1; and λ ω = λ ω1 ⊕ λ ω2 ⊕ λ ω3 ⊕ . . . ⊕ λ ωn . In these three expressions, ω 0i , ω 1i and λ ωi are shares of the party p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Note that |ω 0i | = |ω 1i | = k, and |λ ωi | = 1.
For each wire ω, (0 ≤ ω ≤ W −1), in the circuit, each party, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), needs to generate (2k+1) pseudo random bits, where W denotes the total number of wires in the circuit. Thus, each party, p i , generates a total of (W (2k + 1)) pseudorandom bits.
Party p i generates its shares ω 0i , ω 1i , and λ ωi for wire ω as a concatenation of the b i,j values, where the indices j belong to the range: [(ω(2k + 1) + 1), (ω + 1)(2k + 1)]. For concise notation, let Ω ωk = ω(2k + 1).
Short-cut: Notice that each party p i is required to compute all the previous (j − 1) bits before it can compute the j th bit. However, using its knowledge of the prime factors of N , i.e., p, q, the client can directly calculate any x i,j (hence, the bit b i,j ) using the relation:
mod N , where C(N ) denotes the Carmichael function, which equals the least common multiple of (p − 1) and (q − 1).
Therefore, using the secret values p, q, the client can readily compute ω 0 , ω 1 , and λ ω for any output wire ω in the circuit; i.e., without having to compute ω 0 , ω 1 , and λ ω for any intermediate wire in the circuit. Using the λ ω values for the output wires, the client can translate each of the garbled values returned by the evaluator p e into a plaintext bit and recover the result of the requested computation. The client declares successful output verification only if the garbled output returned by the evaluator matches with either ω 0 or ω 1 , for each output wire ω of the circuit.
Collusion Resistance: Note that, without performing any computation, the evaluator can return one of the two actual garbled outputs for each output wire in the circuit, if and only if it colludes with all the n servers, {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }, that participated in the creation of the garbled circuit, or factorizes N into its prime factors, p and q, which is infeasible.
Unpredictability: Further, the Blum, Blum, Shub pseudorandom number generator guarantees that one cannot predict the next/previous bit output from the generator, even with the knowledge of all the previous/future bits [5] , [28] . Thus, based on the observations of the garbled values during evaluation, the evaluator cannot predict the preceding or subsequent garbled values, or the λ values for any wire in the circuit.
Summary of our Proposed System
We summarize our secure cloud computing model in this subsection.
1) The client chooses a set of (n + 2) servers in the cloud, {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , p c , p e }. Then, it provides a description of the desired computation, and a unique seed value s i to each server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n). It also provides another seed value s ik to each pair of servers, The client instructs all n servers, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to send their shares GC i to the server p c . Performing only XOR operations, the server p c creates the desired circuit, GC = GC 1 ⊕ GC 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ GC n . Now, the client instructs the server p c to send the garbled circuit GC to server p e for evaluation. 6) Using the unique seed values s i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the client generates garbled input values for each input wire in the circuit, and sends them to the server p e for evaluation. Using these seed values, the client also generates the λ values and the two possible garbled values for each output wire in the circuit, and keeps them secret. 7) Using the garbled inputs, the server p e evaluates GC, and obtains the garbled outputs for each output wire in the circuit and sends them to the client. Using the λ values, the client now translates these garbled values into plaintext bits to recover the result of the requested computation. 8) The client checks whether the garbled output for each output wire in the circuit that is returned by the evaluator, p e , matches with one of the two possible garbled values that it computed on its own. If there is a match for all output wires, then the client declares that the evaluator in fact carried out the requested computation.
COMPLEXITY

Circuit size of one garbled table entry
In this section, we analyze the size of the Boolean circuit (B ) that computes one specific entry (A ab ) in the garbled table. Assume that each gate takes two input bits to produce one output bit. Recall from Section 4.1.1 that
, where ⊗ ∈ {XOR, AN D} denotes the binary operation of gate A.
Computing s requires a total of 3 + 3(n − 1) = 3n XOR gates and 1 ⊗ gate, since
Boolean circuit B includes a multiplexer that chooses γ s using the expression, γ s = ((γ 0 ⊕γ 1 ).s)⊕γ 0 . This expression is composed of 2 XOR gates and 1 AND gate. Since |γ 0 | = |γ 1 | = nk+1, and LSB(γ s ) = s, multiplexing is performed on the most significant nk bits. We can build this multiplexer using a total of 2nk XOR gates and nk AND gates. Now, the expression
has (2n + 1) terms, which are combined using 2n XOR operations. Since, each term has a length of (nk + 1) bits, computing this expression requires a total of 2n(nk + 1) XOR gates.
To summarize, the Boolean circuit (B ) that computes one specific garbled table entry (A ab ) has a total of (3n + 2nk + 2n(nk + 1)) XOR gates, nk AND gates, and 1 ⊗ gate. Fig. 3 shows the total number of gates in the circuit that computes A ab , when A is an AND gate, as a function of n for a fixed value of k = 128 bits. Notice the relatively small number of AND gates in the circuit. For example, when n = 6, the circuit that computes A ab has a total of 10782 XOR and 769 AND gates. While the number of XOR gates increases quadratically with n, the number of AND gates increases only linearly with n.
Let B denote the Boolean circuit that corresponds to the desired computation such as addition of two numbers. Then, while creating the garbled circuit GC for B, the n parties use the circuit B for the protocol of Goldreich to compute each one of the four garbled table entries of the form A ab for each gate A in the circuit B.
Communication cost to compute one garbled table entry
A 1-out-of-2 OT exchange between two parties involves the exchange of: (i) a random element C from the prime order subgroup, G, of Z * p ; (ii) a public key, P K 0 ; and (iii) the encryptions, E 0 , E 1 , of the plaintext messages M 0 , M 1 . Let k denote the security parameter, which equals the size of the plaintext messages, M 0 , M 1 . Let s 1:2 denote the total number of bits that are exchanged during a 1-out-of-2 OT. Then,
A 1-out-of-4 OT exchange between two parties includes: (i) two 1-out-of-2 OTs, and (ii) four encryptions, E 00 , E 01 , E 10 , E 11 . Let s 1:4 denote the total number of bits that are exchanged during a 1-out-of-4 OT. Then, s 1:4 = 2(s 1:2 ) + 4k = 8(|p| + k). Note that |p| and k are public and symmetric key security parameters, respectively. For example, |p| = 3072 achieves the equivalent of k = 128-bit security [2] ; in this case, the sum of the sizes of all messages exchanged during a 1-out-of-4 OT is s 1:4 = 3200 bytes. For each AND gate in the circuit B , all possible pairs of the n servers, (p i , p j ), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, engage in a 1-out-of-4 OT, and there are a total of n(n − 1)/2 combinations of (p i , p j ). Since the number of AND gates in the circuit B is at most (nk + 1), the total number of 1-out-of-4 OTs is t 1:4 = (nk+1)×n(n−1)/2.
At the completion of the secure multiparty computation protocol of Goldreich, each server, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), sends its share (A ab ) i to another server, p c , to create the desired garbled table entry, A ab . Since |(A ab ) i | = nk + 1, the server p c receives a total of s = n(nk + 1) bits from the other n servers.
To summarize, in order to create one entry, A ab , the total amount of network traffic, T = (t 1:4 ×s 1:4 )+s = (nk + 1)[(4(|p| + k) × n(n − 1)) + n]. When the security parameters, k and |p|, are fixed, the network traffic is a cubic function of n. Fig. 4 shows the network traffic to create one garbled table entry as a function of n. For example, when n = 5, the cloud servers exchange a total of 19.56 MB of data in order to create a single entry in the garbled table.
Let N g denote the total number of gates in the circuit B that corresponds to the desired computation. Then, in the process of creating the garbled circuit, GC, the total amount of network traffic equals 4N g × T .
Computation cost of creating the garbled circuit
Let W denote the total number of wires in the circuit B. For each wire, each server, p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), generates (2k + 1) bits using the Blum, Blum, Shub (BBS) pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) for its share of garbled values and the λ value. Therefore, the n servers collectively generate a total of b 1 = n(2k+1)W bits using the BBS PRNG. Let N denote the modulus value in BBS PRNG (note: |N | = 3072 achieves 128-bit security [2] ). Then, n(2k+1)W modular multiplication operations in Z * N are necessary to generate bits using BBS PRNG.
Let W o denote the number of output wires in the circuit B. Let G denote the PRNG, which we have described in Section 4.1.3, that outputs a sequence of (2nk + 2) bits on providing a k-bit input seed. Each server uses the PRNG G, on its share of each garbled value for every non-output wire in the circuit B. Then, in the process of creating the garbled circuit, the n servers collectively use the PRNG G, 2n(W − W o ) times to generate a total of b 2 = 4n(nk + 1)(W − W o ) bits.
Let N g denote the total number of gates in the circuit B. For protocol of Goldreich, the total number of pseudorandom bits generated by each party using the PRNG R, equals 8(n−1)m×N g , where m = (3+2(nk+ 1) + 2k) (Section 4.2). Thus, the n parties collectively generate a total of b 3 = 8n(n−1)(3+2(nk+1)+2k)×N g bits using the PRNG R.
Note that both the PRNG G and PRNG R can be realized using a block cipher such as AES operating in output feedback mode.
Let t 1:4 denote the number of 1-out-of-4 OTs to create one garbled table entry (Section 5.2). Then, the total number of 1-out-of-4 OTs to create the complete garbled circuit GC is at most
During a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, the sender and chooser generate a total of |C| + |k| + |r 0 | + |r 1 | = (4|p| − 1) bits. Each 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer involves the cost of two 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers, in addition to generating a total of |L 0 | + |L 1 | + |R 0 | + |R 1 | = 4k bits. A very small constant number of modular arithmetic operations, AES and SHA crypto operations are carried out during each OT (Section 3.2 and Section 3.3). While creating the garbled circuit GC, these sets of operations are performed 4N g × (nk + 1) × n(n − 1)/2 times; and a total of b 4 = 4N g × (nk + 1) × (n(n − 1)/2) × (8|p| + 4k − 2) bits are generated during the OTs.
To summarize, the total number of bits that are generated by the n parties while creating the garbled − 2) ). Thus, for any given Boolean circuit, when the security parameters k and |p| are fixed, the total number of bits generated randomly is a cubic function of n.
For example, consider the construction of a garbled circuit for adding two 32-bit numbers. The corresponding Boolean circuit has a total of W = 439 wires, W o = 33 output wires, and N g = 375 gates 3 . Fig. 5 shows the total number of Mbits that are generated randomly while creating one garbled table entry (i.e., 3 . The 32-bit adder circuit in [29] has 127 AND gates, 61 XOR gates and 187 NOT gates. Note that a NOT gate is equivalent to an XOR gate, since NOT(x) = (1 ⊕ x). Number of Mega bits generated randomly to construct one garbled table entry
Number of parties (n) Fig. 5 . Total number of Mega bits that are generated randomly in the process of creating one garbled table entry for the 32-bit adder. ) for the 32-bit adder. As an example, when n = 5, these parties collectively generate a total of 153.41 Mbits, randomly, to create one garbled table entry.
Cost of evaluating the garbled circuit
In order to perform the requested computation, the server p e obtains the garbled circuit, GC, from the server p c . Let N g denote the total number of gates in the circuit B. Each entry in the garbled table has a length of (nk + 1) bits. Therefore, the size of the garbled circuit equals 4N g × (nk + 1) bits. Fig. 6 shows the size of the garbled circuit in kilo bits for the 32-bit adder. This circuit has N g = 375 gates. The security parameter k = 128.
Let W and W o denote the total number of wires and output wires, respectively, in the Boolean circuit B. During evaluation, for each non-output wire of the circuit, the server p e uses the PRNG G n times. Therefore, G is used for a total of (W − W o )n times.
Cost for the client
To enable the creation of the garbled circuit, the client provides: (i) a unique seed value, s i , to each server p i , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and (ii) a seed value, s ik , to each pair of servers
For the BBS PRNG, the length of each seed value, |s i | = |N |. For the PRNG R, which can be implemented using a block cipher such as AES in output feedback mode, the length of each seed is |s ik | = k. Number of kilo bits generated by the client Number of parties (n) Fig. 7 . Total number of kilo bits that the client generates to delegate the construction and evaluation of the garbled circuit, and to verify the outputs for the 32-bit adder.
Therefore, the total number of bits that the client exchanges for the seed values is
For each plaintext input bit to the circuit, the client is required to generate the garbled input. Each garbled value is (nk + 1) bits long, whose least significant bit depends on the λ value. Since the λ value, in turn, depends on the 1-bit shares for the n parties, the number of bits that the client needs to generate for each input wire equals b i = (nk + n).
To enable verification of outputs, the client needs to generate both possible garbled outputs for each output wire. Therefore, the number of bits that the client needs to generate for each output wire equals b o = (2nk + n).
To summarize, the client generates/exchanges a total of
bits, where W i and W o denote the number of input and output wires, respectively, in the Boolean circuit B. Fig. 7 shows the total number of kilo bits that the client generates in order to enable the servers to construct and evaluate the garbled circuit, as well as for the verification of outputs for the 32-bit adder. This circuit has W i = 64 input wires and W o = 33 output wires. The security parameters are k = 128 and |N | = 3072.
Comparing Fig. 7 with Figs. 4 and Fig. 5 , we notice that while the servers generate and exchange Gigabytes of information to create the garbled circuit, the mobile client, on the other hand, generates and exchanges only kilobytes of information with the evaluator and the other servers.
Comparison of Our Scheme with Gentry's FHE Scheme
While Gentry's FHE scheme [13] uses only one server, it, however, requires the client to exchange O(k 5 ) bits with the evaluating server, for each input and output wire of the circuit. In our secure cloud computing system, since each garbled value has a length of (nk+1) bits, for each input and output wire, the client only exchanges O(nk) bits with the server p e . For example, with k = 128, the size of each encrypted plain text bit equals several Gigabits with Gentry's scheme, while it equals a mere 641 bits in our approach with n = 5. Thus, our approach is far more practical for cloud computing in mobile systems in comparison to FHE schemes.
Construction and evaluation time
We implemented our secure cloud computing system using BIGNUM routines and crypto functions from the OpenSSL library. We built our system as a collection of modules, and the servers communicate using TCP sockets. We evaluated our system on a server with Intel Xeon 2.53 GHz processor, with 6 cores and 32 GB RAM 4 . Fig. 8 shows the time taken to construct one garbled table as a function of n. We note that the garbled tables for any number of gates in the circuit can be constructed in parallel, which will significantly reduce the construction time. Fig. 9 shows the time taken to evaluate one garbled gate as a function of n. Comparing Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , we observe that evaluation is significantly faster than construction, where the latter can be done offline. If the garbled circuits are pre-computed, and made available to the evaluator, in advance, it can readily carry out the requested computation, and therefore, drastically reduce the response time for the mobile client. 
PRIVACY PRESERVING SEARCH FOR THE NEAREST BANK/ATM
We examine the following privacy preserving application in this section. A mobile client, which is located at the intersection of two streets, needs to determine the location of the nearest Chase or Wells Fargo bank or ATM machine in a privacy preserving manner. We evaluate our application using real-world data available for Salt Lake City, UT, whose streets are arranged in a grid pattern. Our application assures the privacy of the following -(i) the mobile client's input location, (ii) the computed bank/ATM location nearest to the client, and (iii) the computed distance to the nearest ATM. Note that these secrets are revealed to the evaluator only if it colludes with all the n servers that participate in the creation of the garbled circuit.
We consider an area of Salt Lake City, UT that lies between Main street (which represents 0 East street), 1300 East street, South Temple street (which represents 0 South street), and 800 South street. This area consists of L = 10 ATM locations that are shown in Table 2 .
Each East/South coordinate in this area is an l = max( log 2 1300 , log 2 800 ) = 11-bit unsigned number. Therefore, the location of the mobile client at an intersection, or any bank/ATM in this area can be identified using L ind = 2l = 22 bits.
Circuit for Computing Manhattan Distance
Let (x a , y a ) represent the coordinates of the mobile client at an intersection. Similarly, let (x b , y b ) represent the coordinates of a bank/ATM. Since the streets are arranged in a grid pattern, the shortest distance (D) between (x a , y a ) and (x b , y b ) equals the sum of the absolute differences between the respective coordinates: D = |x a − x b | + |y a − y b |. This distance metric is more commonly referred to as the Manhattan distance.
We design a Boolean circuit for computing the Manhattan distance between two points, (x a , y a ) and (x b , y b ). Assume that each coordinate is an l bit unsigned number. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the block diagram of our circuit. We use the SU B and ADD blocks of Kolesnikov et al. [19] . Each SU B/ADD block is composed of l 1-bit subtractors/adders; each 1-bit subtractor/adder, in turn, is composed of 4 XOR gates, 1 AND gate. Note that (l + 1) th output bit of SU B block equals the complement of carry-out bit from the l th 1-bit subtractor. If x a ≥ x b , then the output of SU B block equals the absolute difference, |x a − x b |. Otherwise, the output of SU B block equals the negative value, −|x a −x b |, in 2 s complement form. Since x l+1 = 1 for negative values, we use x l+1 as one of the inputs for the XOR gates in the IN V block to compute the 1 s complement of the absolute difference. Then, we subsequently use x l+1 as a carry-in input bit for the ADD block. Thus, the output of the ADD block accounts for both x a ≥ x b and x a < x b cases.
Similarly, for the Y coordinates we use the SU B and IN V blocks to compute the absolute difference in 1 s complement form. To account for the case when y l+1 = 1, we use an IN C block that adds the value of the bit y l+1 to the output of the ADD block. The IN C Using the circuit design of Figure 10 and Figure 11 , a list of distances between the location of the mobile client and any number (L) of ATM locations can be computed. Table 3 shows that our Boolean circuit for computing the Manhattan distance between two points has a total of (15l + 1) XOR gates and 4l AN D gates.
Note: In a more direct alternative to compute Manhattan distance, we may first find min(x a , x b ) and max(x a , x b ), and always subtract min(x a , x b ) from max(x a , x b ) (similarly for the Y coordinates). While this approach would eliminate IN V and IN C blocks, it however would require the use of two comparator and conditional swap blocks [18] , which together introduce 12l new XOR gates and 4l AN D gates. Consequently, this alternative approach to compute Manhattan distance would require a total of 24l XOR gates and 7l AN D gates. Thus, in comparison to this more direct alternative, our design shown above in Figure 10 and Figure 11 requires a significantly smaller number of (15l + 1) XOR and 4l AN D gates.
Circuit for Computing the Nearest ATM
Following the computation of distance between the mobile client and L ATM locations, it is necessary to find the nearest ATM, along with its distance. We use the approach of Kolesnikov et al. [19] to find the minimum value and its index, given a list of values. Kolesnikov et al. have designed a M IN block to find the minimum of two input values -it uses the result of a comparator to multiplex the minimum value, as well as the corresponding index as shown in Figure 12 . Table 4 shows the size of the circuit that computes the minimum of two values, along with its index. In our privacy preserving application, each distance is an (l + 1) = 11 + 1 = 12-bit number, and each index that identifies an ATM using its East and South coordinates is an L ind = 2l = 22-bit number.
Given L values and their indices, using (L−1) M IN blocks organized as a tree, the minimum value and the corresponding index are propagated from the leaves to the root. Figure 12 shows the computation of the minimum of 4 input values, D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , D 4 , and the corresponding index, i min(D1,D2,D3,D4) , as an example. Table 5 shows the number of XOR and AN D gates in the complete circuit that computes the nearest ATM location. It shows that in our privacy preserving application of finding the nearest Chase or Wells Fargo ATM in Salt Lake City, the circuit has a total of 2596 XOR and 854 AN D gates. Figure 13 shows the network traffic as a function of the number of servers (n) involved in the creation of the garbled circuit that can compute the nearest ATM and the corresponding distance in a privacy Number of parties (n) Fig. 13 . Server-side network traffic to construct the garbled circuit for determining the nearest ATM. preserving manner. For example, with n = 4 servers, the servers exchange a total of 126 GB of information to create the garbled circuit. This result demonstrates the feasibility of our approach for performing realworld privacy-preserving computations.
Server-side and Client-side Cost
In order to facilitate the creation of the garbled circuit, and for the evaluation, the mobile client sends -(i) the seed values to the n servers, and (ii) the garbled values representing the coordinates of the input location to the evaluator. Since the ATM locations are publicly known, they are assumed to be hard-coded in the garbled circuit. i.e., the client is not required to transmit the ATM locations to the servers. Figure 14 shows the total number of bits generated by the client to delegate the privacy preserving computation of the nearest ATM. To preserve location privacy, the client exchanges a very small amount of information with the servers -less than 60 kilo bits, with n = 4 servers, for example. Comparing Figure 13 and Figure 14 , we note that the client-side cost grows much slowly with the number of servers, in comparison to the server-side cost.
RELATED WORK
Homomorphic encryption is an approach that enables performing computations directly on the encrypted data, without requiring private decryption keys. For example, in the RSA public key system, the product of two ciphertext messages produces a ciphertext corresponding to the product of the underlying plainas output without performing any computation. We presented an analysis of the server-side and clientside complexity of our system. Using real-world data, we evaluated our system for a privacy preserving search application that locates the nearest bank/ATM from the mobile client. We evaluated the time taken to construct and evaluate a garbled circuit for varying number of servers, and demonstrated the feasibility of our proposed approach.
